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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to examine issues related to the
coverage of preventive care under national health insurance. Four
specific kinds of medical care services are included under the
rubric of preventive care: prenatal care; pediatric care, dental
care, and preventive physicians' services for adults. We consider
whether preventive care should be covered under national health
insurance, and if so what is the nature of the optimal plan. Our
review of the literature on the effects of medical care on health
outcomes suggests that prenatal care and dental care are effective,
but pediatric care (except for immunizations) and preventive doctor
care for au1ts are not. Moreover, health outcomes in which care
is effective correspond to outcomes in which income—cifferences in
health are observed. These empirical results and the theory of
health as th source of consumption externalities indicate that the
optimal NHI plan should be characterized by benefits that fall as
income rises. In additon, the plan should be selective rather than
general with respect to the types of services covered.
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The numerous plans for national health insurance (NHI) introduced
during the l970s have emphasized the extension of coverage to twotypes
of services where private health insurance benefits are thought to be
lacking or inadecuate: medical care services associated with cata—
stroühjc illness andmedicalcare services with a large preventive com-
ponent. Included in the latter category are prenatal care, pediatric
care (care rendered by all physicians to children and adolescents),pre-
ventive check-ups, and dental care. Although some bills introduced in
Congress during the Nixon—Ford Administration focused solely on cata-
strophic illness, most of them, including those supported by the Admin-
istration, contained benefits for preventive care. For example, the
Miic-Schneebe1j.pack Bill, introduced in 1974 andendorsedby the
NixonAdministration, provided benefits subject to a deductible of $150
per person and a coinsurance rate of 25 percent for prenatal and mater-
nitycare, well—child care to age six,dental care to age thirteen, and
visionand eye examinations to age thirteen)! Preventivecheck—ups
for adults were excluded from the basic benefits, but theprovisions of
the bill to stimulate enrollment in prepaidgroup health plans (health
maintenance organizations) would have resulted in an increase inthe
percentage of the population insured for this service. Other bills,
most notably those associated with Senator Kennedy,were even more
liberal with respect to the coverage ofpreventive medical care. While
phase one of PresidentCarter's recent national health insuranceplanfocuses on catastrophic illness, pregnant wonen and infants up to the
2/ age of one would he guaranteed free care regardless of fanily 1nco:ne.
Presumably,coverage would be extended to other types of preventive care
afterthe initial phase—in period. Governor Brcwn has recently advo-
cated an all—outemphasis on prevention.
The purpose of this paper is to examine issues related to the
coverage of preventive care under national health insurance. In par-
ticular wetry toanswer twobasicquestions. Shouldpreventive ser-
vices be covered? If so, what is the nature of the optimal plan? As
part of the second question, we investigate whether coverage should be
universal or limited bothwithrespect to which groups in the popula-
tion are insured and which preventive services are covered. In order
t dl with these two basic issues, several other issues must be ad-
dressed.In Section I of the paper, in an effort to shedlight on the
extentof "underinsurance," we discuss the extent of present third—
?caLy(privateandpublic)coverage of preventive medical careser-
vices. InSection II we review the literature on the effects of pre-
ventive medical care on health outcomes. Clearly this review is rele-
vant since one of the goals of coverage of preventive care under NHI is
to improve the health of the population. In Section III we review the
literature on the determinants of utilization of preventive medical
care services. Here ourfocusis on the effects of variables that are
under the purview of public policy (price, income, and health manpower)
and on variables whose effects government policy might try to offset
(socioeconomic and family characteristics). Implications for an opti
nal plan are treated in Section IV.
2fore turning to the rr.ain lsuesin the panr, it willbe el—
fulto discu3s severalconceptual isueg. These rvolve around the
definitjonof preventive care, the types of uedica]. services included
underthe rubric of preventive care, and the appL-opriaten'ss of in-
suring this care. We define preventive care activities as activieje
orinputs that may improve health by reducing the probability of an
illness or an accident or that reduce the seriousness of an illnessor
an injurygiventhe occurrence of an unhealthy state. PreventIvecare
is efficacious if there exists a course of action that can be taken
after detection of an adverse symptom that will reduce the needor ex-
tentoflater treatment. Whether preventive care is efficacious or
not is a medical question. Preventive care is said to be effective if
*unitof preventive activity by anindividualimproves his later
health. Effective preventive care requires adequate symptomatic iden-
tification, efficaciousness and cornoliance with the prescribed course
-f action. Hence effectiveness is a stricter requirement than effi-
caciousness,
Preventive activities are not limited to medical care. Indeed,
agood deal of evidence suggests that preventive nonrnedical activities
have much larger impacts onhealththan medical care. We referhere
to the importance in favorable health outcomes of behaviors or life
styles associated withproperdiet, exercise andrecreation,refrain-
ing from smoking cigarettes, avoiding alcohol abuse, andyears offor-
mal schooling completed.2'Byandlarge,we dealwithpreventive nedi—
cal careinthispaper, but the reader should not lose sight of the cx—
trernely importantroleofnon-nedicalfactors in health outco:-s.±'
)e include four specific kinds of mcdicalcare services er the
ribric of preventive care. These are prenatal cares p iatric care
(preventive and curative physicians' services delivered to children
end adolescents); preventive physicians' services delivered to adults
under the aye of 65 including physical examinations, multiphasic
screening,andassociated X—rays and laboratorytestsand dental care
deliveredto children, adolescents, and adults undertheage of 65.
Tokeep the paper manageable, we do not consider preventive care for
persons age 65 and over and therefore do not discuss issues related to
the Medicare program. We focus on the medical services just indicated
because they are all thought to have an important preventive comoonent.
Thisis obvious in the case of preventive physicians' services for
dlts. In the case of children and adolescents, both preventive and
curative services delivered early in life can have important long-run
effects on health in adulthood. Moreover, theappropriatetreatment of
pi.blems revealed by an annual check—up is an integral componentofpre-
ventive care. The importance of prevention is underscored by making
pfriodiccheck—ups required in schools, in thearmed forces, and
metimesat the place of work.
The alleged importance of the early period of life in health out-
comes has led Newberger, Newberger, andRichmond; Keniston and the
CarnegieCouncil on Children;and Marmorto propose that national health
insuranceshould be limited at least initially to rather oomplete cover-
age of prenatal care, pediatric care, dental care forchildren, end in
some instances catastrophic iiinessY Bills limiting national health
insurancesolely to mothers, infants, and children wereintroduced inCongress in 1976 by Senator Javits and Congressman Scheuer. The content
of our paper reflects the legislative and policy interest inpreventive
care for children; the paper contains a selective, rather than a co—
prehensive, discussionofpreventive care for adu1ts.Tokeep the
papermanageable and because of the key role of the physician in the
medical care market, we do not deal with hospital care for children,
Also to keep the paper manageable, we do not treatin anydetailthe
preventivecnponent of adult remedial care delivered in the early
stages of illness, although we recognize that the benefits of preven.-
tionand intervention areperhaps greatest at this stage.
Atfirst glance, it might seem somewhat anomalous to consider the
coverage of preventive care undernational health insurance,Afterall,
Lhe purposeofprivate insurance is to protect against uncertainty.
Thatis, risk averse consuners have an incentive to purchase health in-
surance to finance medical outlays associated with illness andinjury
(unfavorablehealth outcomes or states of the world). In this context
preventive care is a substitute for market insurance; it is a form of
self—insurance or self—protection to usetheterminology introduced by
Ehr].ich and Becker,1' Put differently, there is a good deal ofun-
certainty with respect to the scope and size of remedial medical care
outlays but no such uncertainty with respect to preventive medical care
outlays.
If the sole purpose of national health insurance were toprovide
protection against uncertainty and if the insurance scheme satisfied
several conditions mentioned later in the paper, there would beno
justification for covering preventive care. The key point to realize,
Showever, is that national health insurance has other goals in addition
to reduction of risk. If its goals include improvements in the health
of certain segments of the population or correcting suboptimal private
decisions due to externalities, NHI itself and coverage of preventive
care could be justified even if there were no uncertainty.' We dis-
cuss theoretical justifications for coverage of preventive care under
NHIand optimalintervention strategies inmore detail in Section IV.
I. Extent of Coverage
A.Private Health InsuranceCoverage
PanelA of Table 1 shows the percentage of the civilian population
of the United States under age 65 with private insurance for three types
of medical services in 1970 and in 1976. The three services are (1) doc-
tor office and home visits, (2) X—rays and laboratory exams, and (3) den-
tal care. Panel B shows the percentage of private expenditures for each
service paid by health insurance. The percentage of expenditures covered
S
issmaller than thepercentage of personscovered because most health in-
surance policies contain deductibles, coinsurance rates, upper limits,
and restrictions on, for example, the type of doctor office visits cov-
ered. The most notable trend in the table is the rapid increase in the
percentage of the population withdental insurance from 6.6 percent in
1970 to 24.0 percent in 1976.
Preventive physicians' services delivered to children and adults
take the form of vaccinations and immuriiations, preventive check—ups,
detailed physical examinations, and rnultiphasic screening. Although
these services are associated with doctor officevisits, X—ravs, and
laboratorytests,thecoverage figures in Table 1 cannot be extrapolated
6—--------------------
Table1
PRIVATE HEAJJTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
ServiceCovered 1970 1976
Panel A. Percentage of Population Under65YearsofA9e
with Private Health InsuranceCoverag Te ofService
Doctor Office andHomeVisits 48.0!" 62.2?.'
X-ray and LaboratoryExaminations 73.8/ 75.0?.'
Dentist's Services 6.6-!' 24.0?.'
Panel B. Percentage of Private ExtiendituresPaid_ Private Health Insurance byTypeof Service
Doctor Office and Home Visits for
People under 65 Years of Age
Note: includes X-rays and laboratory
Cl testsassociated with office visits 22.1— 28.6—
Dentist's Services 3.8" 14.9'
a! Source: Marjorie Smith Mueller, "Private Health Insurance in1970:
Population Coverage, Enrollment, andFinancialExperience," Social
SecurityBulletin, vol. 35(February1972).
b/ Source:MarjorieSmithCarroll, "Private Health InsurancePlans in
1976,An Evaluation," Social Security Bulletin, vol. 41 (Seotember
1978).
(continued onnextpage)
7Footnotes to Table 1 (concluded)
Cl Source: Ronald Andersen, JoannaLion,andOdin W.Anderson, Two
Decades of Health Services: Socia1yjrendsinUse and Expenditure
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1976).
d./ Computed as follows:
So'K76percentages paid by insurance in 1970 and 1976, respectively.
170, 176 =percentagesof population with private health insurance







C/E—'rce:RobertM. Gibson and CharlesR.Fisher, "National Health
Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1977," Social Security Bulletin, vol. 41
(July1978).
8to these preventive services. This is becausemost health insurance plans
do not cover preventive care.!" On the otherhand, prepa.id group prac-
tice plans, comron1y termed health maintenanceorganizations (HNOs), do
cover preventive physicians' services. In 1976approximately 4 percent
of persons with private doctor office visitinsurance were members of
prepaid group practice p1ans.!2' It should be noted thatfraud by phy-.
siciang and patients canmaice insurancecompanies' exclusion from coy-
erage of preventive services difficult to enforce. That is, infilling
outan insurance claim, a physician can report that hedelivered cura-
tive services when in fact he deliveredpreventive services. Although
the extent of such fraud isnotknown, our own casualempiricism sug-
gests it is not unimportant. Our own casual empiricismalso suggests
ttdentalinsurance, especially the newer plans, do coverpreventive
check—upssubject to deductibles, coinsurance, and specifiedmaximum
11/ payments.—
According to the health survey conducted by the NationalOpinion
Research Center andtheCenter for Health Administration Studies of the
University of Chicago (the NORC survey), 51percent of children between
the ages of zero andfiveand53percent of children between the ages
of six andseventeen had doctor office visit insurance inl970)—f
Thisinsurance covered 13.6 percent of theprivate outlays on doctor
office visits on behalf of theyounger children and20.7percent of the
private outlays on behalf of the older children.There is evidence
that the NORC estimates of thepercentage of children with doctor office
visitinsurance are too large,Unpublished data from the National
Centerfor HealthStatistics indicate thatapproximatelyone—third of
all children had suchcoverage in 1972)2.1
9Tn 1970, 74 percent of all live births to woren not eligible for
Medicaid or other public funds were covered by private health thsur—
ance.' This ir.surance financed 49 percent of total private expendi-.
tures per live birth and 46 percent of obstetrical services delivered
by physicians. Obstetricians typically charge pregnant wcen a flat
feefor prenatal visits and the delivery ofthe child rather than a
feefor each prenatal visit. Therefore, the figures just cited give a
good indication of the extent of coverage for all physicians' services
associated with births. Data on prenatalinsurance coverage arenot
availablefor years after 1970, but Andersen, Lion, and Anderson report
15/ thatsuch insurance increased over time between 1963 and1970.—
Tosummarize, preventive physicians' services for children and
iuitgare not usually covered by private health insurance except in
the case of prepaid group practice plans. Between one—third and one—
half of all children have doctor office visit insurance, nxst of which
finances curative (remedial) medical care services. The percentages
of the population with prenatal and dental insurance have risen sub-
stantially over time."
B. Public Coverag
The main public sources of coverage for the medical care services
considered in this paper are Medicaid, the matern.al andchildhealth
17/ program, and the neighborhood health center program.— All of these
programs are aimed primarily at low—inccxoe families. Of the three
programs, Medicaid by faristhe largest. In 1976, it accountedfor
approximately 95 percent of total public expenditures on the three
programs combined.
10The Medicaid program was enacted in 1965 as Title XIX of theSo—
cia]. Security Act. It is a joint Federal—stateprogram designed to
financethe medical care services of specifiedgroups of needy persons.
Medicaid eligibility is linked to welfare eligibility. States that
elect to participate in the program (all states except Arizona have
elected to do so) must cover all families covered by the aid to fainil—
ies with dependent children (AFDC) program):!' Statesmay also pro-
videMedicaid coverage to the medically needy.These arepersons
whoseincomes net of medical expenses are 133 1/3 percent or less of
the AFDC eligibility income level in each state.Twenty—eight states
provide coverage for the medically needy. In twenty—six states AFDC
is restricted to families without a father present in the home.
Twenty—four states extend AFDC and Medicaidcoverage to families with
unemployed fathers who do not receive unemployment compensation.
Seventeenstates cover all children under the age of twenty—one in
tami1ies with incomes below the AFDC eligibility level,regardless of
the employment status of the parents or thefamily composition.
It is well known that AFDC income eligibility levelsvarycon—
sierab1y among states. This factor, together with the factorsmen-
tioned above, causes a considerable percentage of low—incomepersons
to be ineligible for Medicaid. In 1970 Davis and Schoen estimatethat
45 percent of the poverty population of children underage twenty-one
and39 percent of thepoverty population of adults between the ages of
20/ twenty—oneandsixty—fourdid not receive Medicaid benefits.—
In some states Medicaid recipients areeligiblefor benefits for
all four medical care services discussed in thispaper: prenatal and
11obstetrical care, pediatric care, preventive physicians' services for
adults, and dental care. All states must cover physicians' services.
Coverage of dentists' services is optional, and in 1974 only 16 per—
cent of all white persons covered by Medicaid and 15 percent of all
nonwhite persons covered saw a dentist..Y Although Medicaid is
characterized by the absence of deductibles and coinsurance, states
can restrict the kind and amount of physicians' services covered in a
number of ways. In twenty states single women pregnant with their
first child are ineligible for prenatal and obstetrical care becaue
the AFDC programs of these states do not cover "unborn children."
Some states limit the number of physician office visits per person to
a specified numberpermonth or per year. Some states exclude routine
physical examinations arid screening for adults.-t Moreover Medicaid
does not cover the indirect costs of obtaining medical care: outlays
ontransportation andthe value of thetime spent in traveling, wait-
ing, andobtaininginformation about alternative sources of care.(
In 1967 an early and periodic screening, diagnosis, andtreatment
(EPSDT)program wascreated under Medicaid. By July 1, 1969, all states
weremandated toprovideEPSDTservicesto children under theage of
twenty—onewho wereeligibleunder the state's Medicaid program. The
enactment of this program changed the nature of Medicaid frxn simply a
payment mechanism to finance services to anactivedeliverer of services
topoor children. States were required to seek out such children, ad-
vise them or their families of the availability of benefits, and ensure
that they receive them.
12The errtphasis of the EPSDTprogramhas been on screening. The
screening examination must include a physical examination, provision
of appropriate jmmunizatjon, vision andhearing tests,laboratory
tests,and adental examination for children threeyears of age and
older. In fiscal1977, 2.0million children of an estimated Medicaid
population of 11.0 million children received screening services. This
increasedthe number of children with up—to—date assessments to 30
• 25/ million.—
Thefailure of Medicaid tocover all pregnant women andchildren
in the poverty population andthefailure ofthe EPSDT program to
screen all children eligible for Medicaid has led the Carter Admninis—
tratiori to propose the Child Health Assurance Program (CHAP).A bill
amendTitle XIX of theSocialSecurity Act to create CHAP was intro-
duced in Congress in 1978 (HR 13611) and modified and reintroducedin
1979 (Hr 4053). To date, thelegislationhas not been enacted into
law.
Under CHAP national income standards would be establishedfor de—
termining the eligibility of pregnant women and children forMedicaid.
7crpregnant women, the standard is $3,000, increased by $600 for each
additional, family member.'Forchildren, the standard is $2,400 for
anindividual (relevant for older children who do not livewith their
parents), $3,000fora family of two, and an additional $600 for each
additionalfamily member.These uniform national standards would add
100,000pregnant women to the Medicaid rolls and approximately 2 mil-
lion children. States would be required to financeprenatal care for
pregnant womenand routinedental care for chi1dren.!/
13Finally, funds are authorized to allow the EPSDT program's adzninistra—
tors to publicize the availability of these services. CHAPwouldin-
crease the cost of Medicaid by roughly $400 millionj this should be
conpared with total Federal andstateexpenditures on Medicaidof$14
billion in fiscal 1976.
Withtheexception of the EPSDT program, Medicaid is a mechanism
for financing the medical care services of poor people ratherthan a
mechanismfor delivering these services. On the other hand the mater-
nal and child health program (MCH) and the neighborhood health center
program (NHC) focus both on delivery and on financing of services to
poor people. The MCII program was created by Title Vofthe Social
Security Actof1935. In 1963 Title Vwas amendedto include special
irnt for maternity and infant care CM and I) projects designedto
provideadequate prenatal care. In 1965 Title Vwasfurther amended
toinclude children and youth (C andY)projects.Thesesupply coin-
&lsivemedicalcare services in poverty areas.
In 1965 the programtocreate andfund neighborhood health centers
wasstartedby the Office of Economic Opportunity as part of the War on
Poverty,By 1973 overall control ofthe centers had been shifted to the
Bureauof Community Health Services of the U.S. Department of Health,
Education,andWelfare. These centers provide ambulatory care services
to all age groups in the population. In1974 36 percentof registrants
inNHCs werechildren below theage offifteen, 45percent ofregis-
trants were between the ages of fifteen and forty—four, 13 percent of
registrants were between the ages of forty—five and sixty—four, and
6percent were sixty—five or older (compared to 14percent of the
14elderly in the poverty population).f Hence children and adults not
eligible for Medicare are the main recipients of services deliveredby
NHCg.
In both the MCH and NHC programs, funds are allocateddirectly to
suppliers:state and local health departments; special clinics and
centers for the medical care of pregnant women, infants, children, and
youths; and neighborhood health centers. Note that suppliers are not
physicians or dentists in private practice. Taken together, the MCH
and NHC programs cover prenatal care, pediatriccare, preventive
physicians' services for adults, and dental care. But theseprograms
are very small relative to Medicaid: in fiscal 1976 Medicaidoutlays
were nineteen times as large as outlays on the MCH and NHC programs..2.'
To swrimarize, a network of public programs exists to financepre-
natal care, pediatric care, preventive physicians' services foradults,
and dental care for the poverty population and to deliver theseser—
'.'ices to this population. This network has been criticizedbecause it
fails to cover a significant proportion of thepoverty population and
because it emphasizes financing rather than delivery.Nevertheless its
exictence should bekept in mind, particularly since we argue in Section
IVthat a convincing case can be made for limitingpreventive care under
national health insurance to low and moderate—income families.
II. Effects of Preventive Medical Care on Health Outcomes
Inthis section we discuss the effects of preventive medicalcare
on health outcomes. We do not argue that in those instances wherecare
is made effective it necessarily providesgreater benefits than in cases
ISwhere care is less effective. Mter all benefits depend not only on the
health outcome, however measured, but also on the value of a unit of
improved health in the form of reduction in income loss or relief from
painand suffering. By concentrating on health outcomes rather than on
measuresoffull benefit from care, we bypass the difficult issues of
monetary valuation. Our aim is to distinguish those forms of care that
are effective from those that are not. Our review of the literature on
this subject is selective rather than comprehensive. Studies are cited
to illustrate our main points.
-
A.Prenatal Care
There is a growing consensus that prenatal care is effective in
termsof infant health outcomes,althoughItsrelativeimportance re-
mains an open issue. Lewit reportsthatprenatal care, measuredby
the number of prenatal visits to physicians, is an important determi-
nantof birth weightandneonatalmortality in the 1970 NewYork City
birthanddeath cohort.' He also reports thatbirth weight hasa
strongnegativeeffect on postneonatal mortality, so that prenatal
carehas an indirect impact on postneonatal mortality. Based on
interstate regression analyses of neonatal mortality rates for states
of the United States for the years 1952, 1956,1960, 1964, and 1968,
Williams finds that the mortality rate isinversely related to the
numberofboard certified obstetrician-gynecologists perbirth.Y
Inaddition to the evidenceon the effects of prenatal care in
general,there is suggestive evidence in supportof the effectiveness
ofselective public intervention strategies. With various socio-
economicvariables held constant,Williams shows that theinfantmortality rate is negatively related to expenditures per birthunder
iraternaland infant care CM and I) projects in asubsample of states
ofthe U.S. in 1966 arid 1967.2!1 Davis arid Schoensuritnarjze studies
thatpoint to dramatic declines in infant mortality rates over time
in the late 1960s andearly1970s in areas serviced by M and I
projects.2.-f These declines exceeded thoseexperienced by similar
residents of the same city or county who were riot serviced by the M
and I project in their area. Davis and Schoen also point out that
the infant mortality rate of blacks inLeeCounty, Mississippi, was
cutin half between 1970 and 1974. This large decline followed the
opening of a neighborhood health center in the county in 1970.
Currently, the black infant mortality rate in LeeCountyis below
thestate average, ...aremarkable achievement considering that the
county has the lowest educational level of any countyinthe state
34/ andone of the highest poverty ratesM—
Since birth weight rises with prenatalcare, the benefits of
appropriate care arenotlimited to infantmortality outcomes. Birth
weight has strong positiveeffectson intellectual development in
samples of school-age children./ Moreover, Shakotko, Edwards, and
Grossmanfindthat health in adolescence is positively associated
with intellectual development in childhood ina longitudinal sample.2.Y
Since they control for health in childhood, thefinding implies causal-
ity from IQ to health. It meansthatbirth weight has favorable im-
pacts on health throughout the life cycle.
Recent trends in infant mortality in the United Statesprovide
suggestive, although not definitive, evidence of the importanceof
17prenatal care. From 1964 to 1974, the infant mortality rate declined by
3.9 percent per year. This was an extremely rapid rate compared to the
comoarahiefigureof 0.6 percent per year from 1955 to l964.21 The
latter period witnessed the introduction of Medicaid, maternal and in-
fant care projects, and the neighborhood health centerprogram. Rogers
andBlendonassociate the trend in infantmortalitywith these develop-
ments, although they are careful to emphasize that there is no evidence
of a cause—and—effect relationship.!' Fuchs is somewhat more cautious
because the period in question also witnessed the legalization of abor-
tions and the widespread adoption of oral contraceptive techniques..!'
Nevertheless, Fuchs does not deny the effectiveness of adequate medical
care during pregnancy anddelivery,especially for high-risk pregnancies.
B.Pediatric Care
Even such an enthusiastic supporter of national health insurance
for children as Marmor realizes that pediatric care makes small con-
tributionsat best to favorable child outcomeg.2( To besure, immu-
nizations against rubella, measles, diptheria, tetanus, pertussis,
polio,andthe mumps are extremely efficacious. Sharpdeclinesinthe
reportednumberof cases of each disease occurred in the years imme-
diately following the general availability of an immunization against
But routine pediatric care has smallandoften statistically
insignificant effects on the health of children and adolescents in a
number of recent studies.
Edwards and Grossman study the prevalence of obesity, abnormal
corrected distance vision, arid anemia (reflected by low hematocrit
18levels) arnong white adolescents who were members of Cycle 111 of the
U.S. Health Examination Survey.-Y Youths who saw a doctor for a
preventive check—up within the past year (approximately 60 percent of
the sample) have one—half percentage point snaller probabilities of
being obese or of having abnormal corrected distance vision than
other youths, and a one—fifth percentage point higher probability of
having anemia, None of these three differentials is statistically
significant.
Kaplan, Lave, andLeinhardtmeasure medical care input by en-
rollment in a comprehensive health care clinic andmeasurehealth
outputby number of days absent from school in a sample of elementary
school children from low—income families inPittsburgh,Pennsylvania.±'
W4fh raceandsexof the child held constant, enrollment in the clinic
has a smallnegativeeffect on number of days absent from school. Un-
fortunately, the authors could not control for parents' education,
has been shown to be an extremely important factor in child
health outcomes.±Y
Hu measures medical care by the dollar value of Medicaid benefits
andbythe receiptof a regular check—up in a sample of first—grade
childrenin a coal mining county in Pennsylvania, mainly from low-income
families.±./ Medicaid benefits havea positive and statistically sig-
nificant effect on hearing correctioi4W but have no effect on vision
correction. The receipt of a regular check—up has no impact on either
health measure.
Kessner studies the prevalence of middle ear infection and hear-
ing loss, vision defects, andanemiain a sample of black children
19between the ages of six months and eleven years in Washington, D.C.Zt'
He focuses on the relationship between these three health problems and
the usual source of pediatric care (physicians in private solo practice,
prepaid group practice, hospital pediatric outpatient departnents, hos-
pital emergency rooms, andpublicclinics).Kessner finds that source
ofcarehas no effect on prevalence of the three health conditions
with socioeconomic status held constant. Using more sophisticated sta-
tistical techniques, Dutton and Silber have reexamined Kessner's basic
result.—' They report higher than average illness probabilities in
solo practice and lower than average probabilities in prepaid group
practice and in the hospital outpatient departments. These differences
are small, however, and are not always statistically significant.
Dutton also indicates that the frequency of a preventive health check-
up has no significant impact (at the 5 percent level) on the presence
of anemiainthe Kessner sample.-2' - -
Inmanestimateschild health production functionsinwhich pre-
ventive pediatric visits andcurative pediatricvisits appearas
separate inputs." His data sample is the one analyzed by Kessner,
and his health measures are absence of ear, nose, and throat infec-
tions and absenceof earinfection. The two pediatric care inputs
tend to have positive effects on health, but their regression coeffi-
cients are small and rarely statistically significant.
In a senseitis not surprising that pediatric care has little
impact on children's health. Many of their health problems are either
self—limiting, such as morbidity from acute conditions, or irrevers-
ible, such as congenital abnormalities of the neurological system.
20But the studies reviewed above indicate that this lack of potency ex-
tends to health problems that are capable of being affected by pedi-
atric care and by family decisions concerning diet and other formsof
at—home health care, as modified by the advice of physicians,
C. Dental Care
Although appropriate pediatric care has little impact on chil-
dren's physical health outcomes, appropriate dental care is extremely
importantintheir dental (oral) health outcomes, This is illustrated
strikingly by rnultivariate analyses of the numberofdecayed teeth
51/ andthe periodontal index (a negative correlate of good oral health)—
of whiteadolescents who were members of Cycle III of the U.S. Health
Examination Survey by Edwards andGrossman,-'They find that there
arelarge significant impacts ofthereceipt of a preventive dental
visit in the past year on both the periodontal index and the decay in—
dex. In particular, adolescents who did not have a preventive dental
check—up within the past year (approximately 30 percent of the sample)
have periodontal indices and decayscores that areeach about 30 per-
cent of a standarddeviation worse than adolescents who received a
check—up.
Edwards andGrossmanalso provide strong results pertainingto the
efficacy of a publicly provided form of preventive dental care-—water
fluoridation. Youths exposed to fluoridated water have significantly
better oral health than other youths at all conventional levels of
confidence.The fluoridation differentials are smaller, however, than
the corresponding preventive dental care differentials in oral health.
21For example, the fluoridation coefficient in the periodontal index equa-
tion is one—third as large as the preventive dental care coefficient.
In the decay equations, the ratio of the two coefficients equals two—
thirds. Nevertheless, given that the per—child cost of fluoridation
53/ is also substantially below the cost of a preventive dental visit,—
this still remains a cost—effective method of improving dental health.
Moreover, in 1975 approximately 50 percent of the population of the
U.S. resided in coimnunities that had water supplies with less than
optimal fluoride levels.'
Research by Newhouse andFriedlanderquestions the effectiveness
of dental care in adult health outcomes.￿Y Using adults in Cycle i
of the U.S. Health Examination Survey, they report an insignificant
positiveeffect of the number of dentists per capita in the county of
residence on the periodontal index. They do not explicitly recognize,
however, the common—sense proposition that anincreasein a community's
dentalmanpower will not improve oral health outcomes unless it en-
courages more utilization of dental services. In particular,Edwards
andGrossman argue that the appropriate way to measure the impact of
dentists on dental health is to estimate two multiple regressions:
one that relates oral health to the receipt of preventive dental care
andasecond that relates the receipt of preventive dental care to the
per capita number of dentists in the cominunity.-/ They show that the
impactof dentists on the periodontal index estimated in this manner is
very different from the effect estimated by the Newbouse—Friedlander
procedure. Despite the findings by Newhouse and Friedlander, there is
a consensus thatthe receipt of appropriate dental care in childhood
22and in adulthood contributes to better oral health at all stages in the
57/ lifecycle.—
D.Preventive Physicians' Services for Adults
There is little evidence that annual physical check—ups and mass
screening programs for adults lead to improvements in health. Spark
and Phelps suimmarize a number of studies that contain evidence that
screening and check—ups are economicallywasteful andonlyoccasionally
detectconditions that are aided by early treatnient.W Theseauthors
andothers conclude that preventive physicians' services for adults can
raise medical care costs without significantly raising the level of
health.
Tobe sure, there are selected health problems for which preven-
tive care may be efficacious. The best documented cases are for
glaucoma,breast cancer, cervical cancer, hypertension, and syphillis.
For such major illnesses, however, as angina and stomach cancer, the
59/ efficaciousness of a secondary prevention is uncertain.— Moreover,
even when diagnosis and treatment are possible, there are problems
associated with false positives, low prevalence rates, adverse side
effectsof, for example, frequent mainographies to detect breast cancer,
andpoor follow-up compliance.
The above conclusions are highlightedby a longitudinal study of
Inembcr3of the Kaiser—Permanente Health Plan by Cohen and his asso—
ciates.-WIn 1964approximately 10,000 members of the plan between
theages of thirty—five andfifty—fourwere randomly assigned to two
groupscomparableinsocioeconomic status. The study group was urged
23to come in for frequent periodic physical exams, while the control group
was not. By mid—1975, 41 percent of the control group had not received
a check—up, while only 16 percent of the study group had not received a
check—up. Yet between 1965 and 1975, the overall mortality experience
of the two groups was very similar. By 1975, 6.9 percent of the study
group and 7.1 percent of the control group had died, a difference which
is not statistically significant. The control group did, however, have
higher death rates from two illnesses that offer substantial potential
for postponement or prevention: colorectal cancer and hypertension
complications. But even these findings where efficacy of prevention
is established cannot be intertreted as evidence in favor of the ef-
fectiveness of selective, as opposed to mass, screening. The cost of
tting one case of colorectal cancer is extremely high. Only fifty—
five cases were detected by protoscopic exams administered to 47,207
patients in a Mayo Clinic study.Y The detection of one case of
itension is relatively cheap and a standard course of treatment
exists to reduce blood pressure to normal. Despite this, the hyper-
tension mortality differential in the Cohen sample is not statistically
significant.
Itis universally recognized that lowering blood pressure in cases
of extreme hypertension reduces both mortality and other severe comphi—
catioris.t There is also some evidence thatreducing blood pressure
in patients with moderately severe or with mild hypertension also re-
ducesmortality and morbidity. The recognition of the role of hyper—
tension in heart disease and stroke has contributed in part to the
rapid reduction in deaths from these causes since 1968.2.1 For these
24reasons, it is worth considering the cise of hypertension screening in
more detail.
The Veterans Administration Cooperative StudyGroup examined a
group of 143 male hypertensive patients with diastolic blood pressures
between 115 and 126 mm Hg randomly assigned to activeor placebotreat—
met.' In theplacebo group there were twenty—seven cases of severe
complications, while there were only two in the treatedgroup. Four
sudden deaths occurred in the control group and none in the treated
group. The Veterans Administration Study Group also studied 380 male
hyperterisives with diastolic bloodpressuresbetween 90 and 114 mm
Treatment was estimated to reduce morbidity from 55 percent to 18per-
cent over a five year period: terminating morbid events occurred in
thirty—five patients in the control group and only nine patients in the
treated group. There was no reduction in myocardial infarctionor
sudden death. This study was confined to a smallgroup of men and had
very strict criteria. Hence it is difficult to generalize these re-
sults to the population at large.
While hypertension is easy to detect and treatment isefficacious,
in the sense that there is a known course oftreatment, screening for
hypertension seems to have limited value. Lauridsen andGyntelberg
report on a study of male employees in public and private comoanies in
Copenhagen.' A sample of 5,249 malesaged forty to fifty—nine was
initially examined in 1970-71. Of these, 196 had previously undetected
severe or moderately high hypertension. While some dropped out of the
the program, 150 of these men were examined inan outpatient clinic,
treated if judged necessary, and then referred to theirown persor.alphysician for further treatment. A five year follow—up was undertaken
on the 150 men. At follow-up their mortality was twice as high and
their prevalence of major cardiovascular complications (rior—fatalmyo—
cardjaj. infarctionand stroke) was three times as high as the expected
rate for Danish middle—aged men. This relativelypoor prognosis may be
the result of inadequate compliance: only 31 percent of these 150men
were well controlled onantihypertensive medication at the time of
follow-up.Other studies have also shown the low efficiency of public
screening for hypertension.Z/ Finnerty aridhiscolleagues have re-
ported that by screening in supermarketsthey were able to reach 61per-
cent of an adult urban, largely stable population, but that despite all
efforts only 30 percent of those identified as having high bloodpres—
68/ ur 're available for treatment.—
The failure of mass screening in a best possible case (highpreva-
lence, easy detection, kncwn course of treatment) seriously questions
crectiveness of preventive care for adults. Future researchmay
shed light on the effectiveness of preventive care in areas wherecur-
rent evidence is insufficient or not conc1usive..2.' Until suchtime,
however, we believe that the burden of proof should fall on the advo—
cates of effectiveness. -
Proponentsof health maintenance organizations, which providepre-
ventive care at no charge to their members, cite the lower rates of
hospitalization of HMOmemberscompared to the general population as
evidence in favor of the effectiveness of these deliverysystemsand
ofpreventive care. On the other hand, Pauly argues convincingly that
these lower hospitalization ratescan arise from the differential
26reimbursement schemes in IfliOs compared to other delivery systerns.—2.'
In particular, physicians in private practice are pnidon a fee-for—
service basis, while reimbursement in an HMOsettingtakes the form
of capitation payments. Since an I-iMO's cost is increased whena
patient is hospitalized while its revenue is not altered, it hasan
incentive not to hospitalize patients if possible, Inlight of this
factor and the results of the Cohen study, it is unlikely that the
lower hospitalization rates of I-2•1O enrollees implies that their
health is better than that of othergroups in the population.
To summarize, in this section we have argued thatprenatal care
anddental care are effective but pediatric care (other than irmnu—
nizations) andpreventivephysicians' services for adults are not.
Many government health policies aredirectedat blacks andotherlow—
income children andadults.Therefore, it is useful to point out that
in general there is a correspondence between healthmeasures for which
care is effective andhealthmeasures for which race and income differ-.
ences areobserved.Black babies weigh less at birth than white babies
and are more likely to die within the firstyear of life. Similar con-
clusions emerge when babies from low—income familiesarecomparedto
those from high—income families.!2t Data from the Centerfor Disease
Control reveal higher prevalence rates of measles and rubellaamong
black children than among white children andamongchildren who reside
in poverty areas than among children who do not.7!"Edwards arid
Grossmanshow that the oral health of children is better ifthey are
from high—income families or if they are white..:?(Newhouse and
Friedlander reach similar conclusions withrespect to the oral health
27of adults.L/ Edwards and Grossman report that the physical health of
children is not related to race or parents' income, with perents'
schooling and other factors held constant.Z!" Mortality and morbidity
rates of white adults are sitive> related to income in a number of
studies, although black adults have higher mortality rates than whites..Z!
The above suggests that there are income arid race-related differ-
ences in health to offset in some cases but not in others.-' These
differences could be offset by lowering the price of preventive care
for the poor via national health insurance, but they could also be of f—
set by income transfers and other policies. We consider the choices
among alternative policy options in more detail in the next two sections.
III. Determinants of Utilization of Preventive
Medical Care Services
In this section we discuss the determinants of utilization of pre-
ventive medical care services. The coverage of preventive care under
nationalhealth insurance would presumably result in a lower price of
care. Yet the effects of other variables on utilization as well as
'priceare alsodiscussed in this section to identifyvariables whose
ectsgovernmentpolicy might try tooffset (race, income, and other
socioeconomicand family characteristics). Another reason for consider-
ing other variables istocompare a program of price cuts undernational
health insurance with programs to alter other variables in the purview
of public policy (incomeandhealth manpower). For these reasons and
because there are few rnultivariate studies of prenatal care and pre-
ventive doctor care for adults, the section is organized around the ef-
fects of sets of determinants rather than on the determinants of the
28four kinds of care. The sets of determinantsare as follows:(1) ia-.
core, race, andMedicaid;(2) money and time prices; and (3) socio-.
economic and family characteristics represented byschooling and family
size, Incone, race, and Medicaid are treated together becauseproverty
is more prevalent among blacks thanamong whites and because Medicaid
is aimed at low—income groups.
A. Income, Race, and Medicaid
During the period from 1963 through 1976, data on the utilization
ofthe medical care services considered in thispaper contain two prin-
cipalmessages with regard to race and incomedifferences in utiliza-
tion. First, cross—sectional surveys in selectedyears reveal that
whites and high—income families made more use of almost all theseser-
vices. Second, trend data on utilization of thesame service reveal
that income andracedifferences declined over time. To a large ex-
tent, these declines can be traced to Medicaid which reduces the net
orout—of—pocket price of medical care to zero from the point of view
ofthe consumer.21' In the case of pediatriccare, one of the declines
has been substantial: income differences in theaverage numberof phy—
• • 78/ sicianvisits by children disappeared in 1975.— Nevertheless, income
arid racedifferences inmost measures of utilization still are large.
Taffel reports that in 1969 72.4 percent of all whitemothers
but only 42.7 percent of all black mothers startedprenatal care in
the first trimester of pregnancy.22! In 1975 thecomparable figures
were75.9percent for whites and 55.8 percent for blacks. Hence the
differencebetween theprobability that a white mother wouldobtain
:9care within the first trimester and the probability that a black mother
would do so fell by ten percentage points over a five—year period.But
the 1975 differential of twenty percentage points is sizable. A similar
differential emerges when high—income mothers are compared to low-income
mothers. In 1972, 71.2 percent of pregnant women whose family income
was $15,000 or over saw a doctor within the first trimester of preg-
nancy. The corresponding figure for women whose family income was under
$5,000 was 47.2 percent.'
In 1976, white children and children from nonpoverty areas were
more likely to have been immunized against measles, rubella, polio,
mumps, and DPT (diptheria, whooping cough, and tetanus) than black
children and children from poverty areas.' The percentage of all
i!ren between the ages of one arid four immunized against polio de-
clined from 88 percent in 1964 to 75 percent in 1975.82 This trend
and the variations in immunization rates by race and income have been
r°cporisiblein part for the EPSDT program underMedicaidandforthe
proposed CHAPprogram.
We have already indicated that the income difference in physician
"isitsbychildren vanished by 1975. Based on a multiple regression
analysisof physician visits in the 1969 U.S.HealthInterview Survey,
Davis and Reynolds show that this result canbeattributed almost
entirelyto Medicaid,2.' Inparticular, children from families with
anincome of under $5,000 who were eligible for welfare madeapproxi-
mately ore more visit in 1969 than children from families with an in-
come of under $5,000 who were not eligible for welfare. Note that a
substantial fraction of children from low—income families are notelibible for Medjcaid..!" Therefore income differences in visits rc:iin
85/ for these children compared to children £ronlhigh—incomefamilies..—
Moreover, visits rise with income in the 1975 data if the lowest income
category is not considered,' Note finally that black—white differ-
ences in visits have not been eliminated. Black children madeapproxi-.
mately one fewer visit thanwhitechildren in l975.8.?!
Gross income or race differences in other dimensions of pediatric
care utilization have not been altered as much by Medicaid as the per
capita number of visits. In 1973, 18.7 percent of poor children below
the age of seventeen but only 11.9 percent of nonpoor children had not
seen a physician in the past two years.!Y The race difference is al-
most identical to the income difference: 19 percent of black children
cii112percent of white children had not seen a doctor within the past
two years.!!.' With respect to routine physical exams, in 1973 8e9per-
cent of white children under the age of seventeen, 14.8 percent of non-
white children, 20.3 percent of children from families with an income
under $3,000, and 44 percent of children from families with an income
of $15,000 or more received examns,9
7imong children with at least one physician contact in a given year,
white children and nonpoverty children are more likely to see private—
practice physicians in their offices. Black children and poverty chil-
dren are more likely to see physicians in hospital outpatient depart—
91/ ments and public clinics not associated with hospitals.— Among
children with positive visits to physicians in private practice in a
given year,parents'income is positively related to the number of
visits. Colle and Grossman estimate an incomeelasticityof visits of
31.4 in l97O,/ a figure that is much larger than the income elasticity
of visits for adultg.2—" In addition, in a sample of users of physi-
cians in private practice, parents' income is positively related to
the probability that the usual source of care is a boardcertifiedor
nonboard certified pediatrician as opposed to a general practitioner.2-/
In addition, in such a sample black children and Medicaid recipients
are more likely to see general practitioners and the latter group makes
fewer visits than non-Medicaid recipients.2￿( The last two findings
indicate that families on the Medicaid rolls encounter substantial
barriers when they try to take their children to specialists or to
make a relatively large number of visits to physicians in private
practice. In particular, the findings reflect the reluctance of some
physicians in private practice to accept Medicaid recipients as their
patients because of uncertainties and rigidities associated with Medi-
caid reimbursement schedules, some of which fail to recognize physician
specialties
Interactions and relationships among parents' income, race, and
Medicaid in pediatric care utilization are highlighted in a study by
Colleand Grossman withthe 1970 CHAS—NORChealth survey.2.!! They
perform ainultivariateanalysis of the probability that a child between
theages of one and fivehad a preventivephysical examination, i.e. an
examination for reasons other than illness or beáause it was reciuired,
in1970. For whites the observed probability is 34.6 percent and for
blacks it is 28.7 percent. This 6.0 percentage pointgross difference
is reduced to 1.9 percentage points when a number of variablesare held
constant, The latter differential is not statistically significant.
32Put differently, differences in characteristics other than race between
blackand white families fully explainthepreventive care differential.
Black children would have the same probability of receiving an exainina—
tion as whites if they had the same mean values of these characteris—
tics.
In the multiple regression analysis, the probability of having an
exam rises with income and is higher for welfare recipients than for
non—welfare recipients, Of course, blacks have lower income than whites,
but they are more likely to be on welfare. Colle and Grossman show that
black children would have a 2.7 percentage point higher probability of
havinga preventive exam ifthey had the same mean family income as
whites.On the other hand, blacks would have a 2.4 percentage point
lower probability of having an exam if the proportion of blacks on wel-
fare equaled the proportion of whites. Put differently, thewelfare
program,of which Medicaid is an integral part,is an effective policy
toolforeliminating income—related differences in the utilization of
preventive care. Blacks andwhiteswouldhavethe same observed prob-
abilities ifall their characteristics except for income and welfare
eligibilitywere the saine.2'
Dental care is an optional service underMedicaid.Therefore,
incomeand racedifferences in dental care utilization by children
andadults have not declined over time by nearly as much as the cor-
responding differences in pediatric care utilization. Wilson and
White report substantial differences both for children and for adults
in 1973.22.1 For example, data for that year indicate that 58.3per-
cent of poor children under the age of seventeen had not seen a
33dentist in the past two years. The corresponding figure for nonpoor
children was 37.2 percent. The differential probability of use fell
between 1964 and 1973, but the difference in the meannumber ofden-
tal visits by the two groups of children remained constant. A
similar picture emerges when the utilization of poor and nonpoor
aduit-qare examined except that there was a slight reduction in the
gapbetween the mean number of visits by the two groups.
In a multivariate context Edwardsand Grossmanfind that family
incomehas apositive and statistically significant effect on the
probabilitythat a white youth obtained apreventive dental check-up
inthe past year in Cycle III of the U.S. Health Examination Survey.!9."
The ccnputed income elasticity of this probability equals .15. Manning
iielpsestimate a somewhat higher income elasticity of .51 for
white children of all ages in the NORC survey.2/ They also report in-
come elasticities of .64 for white adult females and .73 for white adult
itiales. Manning and Phelps also compute income elasticities of demand
for dental visits by the three groups of whites. These equal .55 for
adult females, .61 for adult males, and .87 for children.
with regard to the use of preventive physician services by adults,
the U.S. Health Interview Survey for 1975 shows a mild positive corre—
lation between number of physician visits per person for general check-
ups and family income up to $15,000 (rising from .37 to .39 visits) and
astrong positive correlation at higher levels of income (.49 visits
forincomes between $15,000 and $25,000 and .55 visits for incomes in
excess of $25,000).!2-( Preventive care as measured by general check-,
ups increases also relative to other forms of care: they constitute
34less than 5 percent of all visits when family income is less than $3,000
and approximately 10 percent when family inco;ne is at least $15,000.
Gross ccnparisons over time reveal that the percentage of persons
with family incomes less than $5,000 who had a general check—up during
the year rose from 28 percent in 1971 to 37 percent in 1975, with little
change in the fraction of the population with general check—ups in in—
103/ come brackets above$5,000,—This remarkable increase in utiliza-
tion at the lower end of the income distribution occurred during the
time when Medicaid was expanded and may be tentatively interpreted as a
direct result of the fall in cost, especially since over the period
1971 to 1975 aggregate real income didnotchange much.
The1963 and 1970 NORC data reveal similar patterns..-2-' For
Lut.h years the percentage of the population having never had a physi-
cal examination is negatively related to income and lower in 1970 than
in1963. Moreover, the interval of time between check—ups is shorter
the higher is family income, and the meanintervalsby income class
seem to be more similar in 1970 than in 1963. The proportion of the
population having never had a physical exam is higher for nonwhites
than it is for whites, but the freauency of exams within a year is
about the same for bothraces,
TheNORCdata distinguish between physical examinations elicited
by the occurrence of self—assessed sytnptomsthose thatarerequired
for a job, school, insurance, armed forces, or similar circumstances;
and those that are preventive.?2￿/ Preventive exams are positively
related to income in both 1963 and 1970. This positive income effect
on prevention is consistent with the evidence from the U.S. T3ealth
35Interview Suvey reported above. y contrast, the fraction of e>:ams
that are required is highest for the middle income groups, and the
fractionof visits elicited by symptomsfalls with family income.
Thesepatterns are consistent with the higher prevalence rates of
diseaseat the lower end of the income distributjon.!PY
Thefraction of physical examsthatare preventive rose from 29
percent in 1963 to 37 percent in 1970. The fraction of such exams
was lower for nonwhites than for whites in 1963, although by 1970 the
difference was eliminated.
More detail on preventive care is available from the 1973 U.S.
Health Interview Survey. It gives information on theutilization of
selectedpreventive services by specific population groups. These
serviccincludeelectrocardiograms, chest X—rays, glaucoma tests,
eye examinations, pap smears, andbreast examinations. In general,
high—incomepersons were more likely to have received these services
ow—incomepersons.!2!.1 These patternsare, however, not always
clear—cut. While for chest X—rays, glaucoma tests, pap smears and
breast examinations, thefractionof persons ever having had an exam
rlsesmonotonicallywith income, for electrocardiograms this fraction
risesonly when family income exceeds $15,000.
Moreover, intervals since last visits for these specific tests
areshorter uniformly by income group onlyforpap smears and breast
exams.For electrocardiograms andchestX—rays, intervals are short-
est at the low and the high end of the income distribution, and for
glaucoma tests intervals shorten only when family income reaches
$15,000.Whites are more likely to have had any one of these trsts than
blacks, except for chest X—rays where the likelihoods are thesame.
For all tests, however, except glaucoma, thepercentage having had a
test in less than a year is higher for nonwhites than it is forwhites.
Our survey of the impacts of income and Medicaid on utilization
reveals that pediatric care and preventive physicians' services for
adults are sensitive to these variables, although the effectiveness of
pediatric care and check—ups is questionable. One explanation of these
results is that people want to verify that they are healthy,-2!"and
the demand for this information is sensitive to income andprice
(Medicaid). A second explanation is that, although preventivecare
may not be effective for the average individual, it may have impacts
on certain individuals. Such differential impact effects areprobably
subjectto a considerable amount ofuncertainty.
B;Money andTimePrices
The coverage of preventive care under national health insurance
would lower the net or out—of—pocket price of care from thepoint of
viewof the conswner. Therefore, estimates of the priceelasticity
of demand for care play a central role in predictions aboutthe ef-
fects of NHI on theutilization of these services. Price effects
were treated to some extent in our discussion of Medicaid inthepre-
vioussubsection. In thepresent subsection our focus is on price
variationsassociated with private health insurance and other factors.
It should be realized that, since the consumer's time isre-
quired to produce health and obtain medicalcare, the relevant price
31in the demand function for care contains a money price component anda
time price component. In the case of a visit to a physician ora den-
tist, the money price pertains to the direct payment to the provider
net of insurance payments. The time price pertains to the sumofthe
time spent traveling to reach the provider and return home and waiting
to see him at the source of care multiplied by the opportunity cost of
time)22.' For pediatric cardordental care for children, since the
mother typically is responsible for the child, the opportunity cost of
time isevaluatedby her actual or potential hourly wage rate in stud-
iesbyInman;Colle andGrossman, and Goldman and Grossman)---&' The
existenceof a time price component implies that the money price elas-
ticity of demandforcare should fall tn absolute value as income
rises, This is because the value of time rises with income. There-
fore,a 1 percent reduction n money price is associated with a
111/ smaller percentage reduction in total price for the rich.— The
pussibility of differential price elasticities by income is relevant
if price cuts under national health insurance are directedat low—
income families and ifcoverageof time costsis excluded. Empirical
evidence with respect to income—related differences in price elastici-
ties and with respect to the effectsof both money price and time
priceare reviewed below.
To our knowledge there are no studies of the effects ofmoney or
time price on the receipt of prenatal care. Information ontheeffects
ofthese variables on the receipt of preventive doctor care by adults
also isverylimited. Luft reports that the greater use of preventive
services byHNO enrolleesis due to their better financial coverage
8rather than to incentives of liMOs to supply such servjces.-2-.'In par-
ticular,he finds that differences in the use of preventive services
disappear when I-ir.iO enrollees arecomparedto non-enrollees with private
health insurance that covers preventive care or with Nedicaid.
Estimates of money price elasticities of demand for physician
visits by children in studies by Inman;Colleand Grossman; and Gold-
man and Grossman are presented in Table 2.i22./ The elasticitiesare
fairly similar; they range in absolute value from .06 to .11. None of
thestudies explicitly investigates whether there are income—related
differences in the price elasticity. Yet the results in the table
shed dome light on this issue because the meanlevelof family income
variesamong the samples analyzed. There isno evidence thatthe
priceelasticity falls in absolute value as income rises; if anything
the reverse is true.The table also containsthe finding that in each
study the income elasticity exceeds the price elasticity by a substan—
tiãi. amount. This suggests that it might be more efficientto increase
physician visits by means of income transfers to low—income families
rather than by means of national health insurance.
Anotheraspect of the impact of money price on pediatric care
servicesinvolves itseffect on the choice ofa specialist or agen-
eral practitioner as the usual source ofcare.ColleandGrossman
andGoldman andGrossmanfind that parents who face lowermoney prices
aremorelikely to select boardcertified pediatricians, This can be
explained by thepresence of the time price componentin the total price
of care. Consider two families one of which has healthinsurance for
doctor visits with a 25 percent coinsurance rate.If time prices do
39Table 2
ESTIMATES OF INCO1E ANDPRICEELASTICITIES OF PEDIATRIC VISITS
- Study
Colle and Grossman Goldrnan and Grossman Inan!"
(1978) (1978) (1976)
Averageincome in
sample $10,000 $6,500 $8,700
Estimateof income
elasticity 0.38 1.32 0.23
Estimate of price
elasticity —0.11 —0.06 —0.09
Sample and year NORC 1970 Bronx, New York Kessner
V
Residents1965—66 1970
i'inanfits separate functions for preventive and curative visits.
His estimates of income and price elasticities of each service are
very similar. We shcM simple averages in the table.
40not varybysource of care, the health insurance policy will lcwer the
total price of a visit to a pediatrician relative toa general practi-
tionerbecause pediatricians charge higher fees thangeneral practi-
tioners. Hence a national health insurance plan that eitherpays a
fixedpercentage of the fee of a visit or reduces noney price to zero
would increase the demand for specialists relative togeneral practi-.
tioners. This might be desirable if visits to pediatricianscontri-
buted to favorable child health outcones. Aswe pointed out in
Section II, however, there is no evidence irasupportof this proposi-
tion.
Both Inman andGoldman andGrossmanreportthat the numberof
visits falls as the time cost of a visit rises. Theelasticities
.15 in the Ininanstudy!Yand —.12 in the Goldman—Grossman
study. Colle and Grossman do not find evidence of anegative time
cost coefficient in their demandcurvefor visits. They do indicate,
ccvar, that the time cost of a visit has a negative and statis-
tically significant effect on the probability thata child obtained a
preventive physical examination within the pastyear. A one dollar
pr visit increase in the time cost of a visit lowers theprobability
of obtaining preventive care by 1.2percentage points. Colle and
Grossman also report that children aremorelikely to have seen a
physician within the past year and have more visits ifthe modeof
transportation to the usual source of care iswalking. This variable
servesas a negative correlate of direct transportationcosts. In
summary, allthree studies show that time andtransportation costs are
significant rationing mechanisms in the pediatriccare market.
41Consequently, even some!edicaidfamilies may act as if the price of
care is substantial.
!ann1ng and Phelps provide price elasticities of derandforden—
talcare for white children, white adult males, andwhiteadult fe—
ma1es.2—1Price elasticities of the probability of a dental check—
up in the past year are-..59for children, —.03 for adult males, and
—.56for adult females. Price elasticities of the numberofdental
visits are —1.40 for children, —.65 for adult males, and —.78 for
adult females. Manning and Phelps allowforan interaction between
income and price in their demand functions and obtain the resultthat
price elasticities increase in absolute value rather than decreaseas
116/
income rises.— They also show that the demand for dentalvisits
wniild bedramatically altered ifdentalcare were covered under na-
tional health insurance. "Demand appears roughly to double foradults
and triple for children, when they pay nothing for dentalcare, rather
-nthefull price.
HoltmannandOlsenstudy the effects of waiting time and travel
time onthenumber of dental visits per family who resided in New York
118/ andPennsylvaniain the period 1971—1972.------ Waiting time has anega-
tive effect on the number of visits, but travel time hasa positive ef-
fect. Their results should be interpreted with caution becausethey
aggregate visits by children and adults in the same family. On the
other hand, Manning and Phelps report significant differencesbetween
the coefficients of demand functions for care by adultsand demand
functions for care by children.!2f Additional evidenceon the role
-of time costs in the demandfordental care is contained in a study by
2Edwards and Grossman.'20 They find that the probability thata youth had
a preventive dental check—up within the past year is smaller if his
mother works full—time in the labor market. Presumably, such mothers
place a bigger value on their time than mothers who do not work.
Time prices are difficult to estimate. It is notsurprising that
their effects are so variable across studies. Anotherway of looking
at time prices is to-estimate their effect indirectly, namelythrough
the effects of health manpower availability on utilization.
Recently—enacted Federal legislation has attempted to increase the
availabilityof physicians and dentistsin medically underserved areas
to expand the use of preventive care in such areas. TheEmergency
Health Personnel Act of 1970 (PL 91—623) created the National Health
Service Corps., whose members are assigned to healthmanpower shortage
areas. The Health Professions Assistance Act of 1976 (PL 94—484)en-
courages new graduates of medical and dental schools to locate in urban
ghettos and rural regions by forgiving their medical education loan
obligations. Further, the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1974
iPL 93—222) gives priority for developmental funding of HNSs ininedi-
callydeprived areas.
In general research on the determninantsof preventivecare utiliza-
tionshows that the receipt of care is sensitive to theavailability of
medical care inputs. Using data from the 1973 U.S.HealthInterview
Survey, Kleininan and Wilson show that the proportion of births tomoth-
ers who began prenatal care in the first trimester ofpregnancy was
lower in areas designated by the Secretary ofHealth, Education, and
Welfare as medically underserved areas (MUAs) than inother areas.!2/
43They also indicate that persons below the age of seventeen were more
likely not to have had a routine physical examination during the past
two years in MUAs. Finally, based on the indicators of preventive
physicians' services for adults mentioned previously (chest X—rays,
pap smears etcetera), adults in MtJAs were less likely to receive pre-
ventive care.
Inmultivariate analyses, Colle and Grossman, Manning and Phelps,
and Edwards and Grossman find that health manpower has large and sta-
tistically significant effects on the family's propensity to obtain
preventive dental and doctor care for its children.!-" For example,
an increase of one dentist per thousand population in the county of
residenceincreases the probability that youths visited the dentist
fcpreventivecareby approximately17 percentage points bothin
Cycle III of the Health Examination Survey andinthe NORC survey.!?!"
It should be noted that these results are unlikely to reflect demand
iipulation by physicians or dentists. The concept of demandInanipu—
lation refers tothe ability of health personnel to shift the demand
curvefor their services, with all direct and indirect costs of these
ervices held constant. Inhis extensive treatment of this phenomenon,
Paulyshows that the demand manipulation effect should be larger in a
sampleof conswners with positive utilization than in asample of all
consumers. Moreover, his model gives no basis for expecting a demand
manipulation effect in an equation that explains the probability of a
124/ check—up.— V
Basedon the above considerations, it is appropriate to interpret
the role of physicians or dentists in the preventive care demand
44function as a reflection of information, entry, travel, waiting, and
direct costs in the parents' decision to obtain care for their off—
spring. In the study by Edwards and Grossman, all factors are at
work because they have no measure of the money price of dental care
or pediatric care and only a crude proxy for time price. Manning and
Phelps control for money price but not for time price. Colle and
Grossman control for both prices so that their findings indicate the
importance of information, inconvenience, and other kinds of entry
costs.
As a prelude to our analysis of optimal health insurance in
Section IV, it is useful to review Edwards and Grossman's estimates
of the impactsof three government programs to improve the oral
health of youths.!￿.' First, they consider a $1,000 income—transfer
to low—income families. This transfer would lower the periodontal
index of youths from these families by .01 points andwouldlower
their decay index by .02 points. (Such a program would also have
other beneficial effects on children and their families.) These es—
'tiicis take account of the direct favorable impact of income on oral
• neaiTh withpreventive dental care held constant, andtheyalso take
account of the indirect favorable impact of- income. In particular,
an increase in income increases preventive dental care which increases
126/ oral health.—
Next Edwards and Grossman consider a programtoreduce or elimi-
nate regional differences in the number of dentists per thousandpopu—
lation. Dentists are more numerous in urban areas than in rural areas.
-Totake two sitesin the Health Examination Survey, there were 1.1
45dentists per thousand population in San Francisco, California, while
there were .2 dentists per thousand population in San Benito, Texas
in 1968. Suppose that this difference were eliminatedby raising the
numer of dentists in SanBenitoby one per thousand population. Then
the periodontal index of youths in San Benito would fall by .04points,
andtheirdecay index would fall by .05 points. Here the mechanism is
an indirect effect alone; the number of dentists per capita is posi-
tively related to the receipt of a preventive dental exam, and the
latter improves oral health. Finally, they consider an 80percent
reduction in the price of a dental check—up due to the enactment ofa
national health insurance plan for dental care with a 20percent co-
insurance rate. Based on research by Manning and Phelpson the imoact
•f•ice on the propensity to obtain preventive dental care for chil-.
dren and youths, Edwards and Grossman estimate that sucha policy
would raise the probability of obtaining care by 16percentage
-poinis,3.a!(This would improve boththeperiodontal andthedecay
scores by .04 points.
Edwards and Grossmanviewtheir con,utatjong as illustrative
rther than definitive. To choose among the threeprograms, infor-
mation on the cost of each program and on the numberofyouths af-
fected clearly is required. Moreover, Edwards and Grossman indicate
that definitive computations of impact effects should ta)eaccount
of the supply elasticity of dental care and the exact natureof the
relationshipbetween dental manpower arid the indirect costs (costs
other than money price) of obtaining dental care, We wouldadd one
further point. A health manpower program differs muchmore in formthan in substance from a program to cover preventive careundernational
health insurance. 1fter all, both programs seek to reduce the total
price of preventive care. NHI cuts the money price component ofcare,
while manpower programs cut both the money price and the indirect price
components. If indirect costs are an important determinant of utiliza-.
tion, as our review indicates, NHI will be much more successful if
policymakers recognize these costs and try to deal with them than if
they ignore them. Put differently, health manper programs and pro-
grains to develop delivery systems that lower indirect costs should not
be ignored when NHI policies are being formulated.
C.SchoolingandFamilySize
Withrace, income, and price held constant, parents' schooling and
familysize are extremely important determinants of the receipt ofpre-.
ventive care. After controlling for husband's education (aproxy for
income) Lewit finds that more educated women are more likely tosee a
physician within the first trimester of pregnancyandto make a greater
128/ number of prenatal visits than less educated women.— Similarly,
pregnant women with few living children receive more prenatal care
thanthose with many living children. Colle and Grossmanreport that
mother's schooling is a positive correlate of the probabilities that
a child had a physician contact and a physical examination within the
pastyear.!2f The numberof children in the family is a negative
correlate of these two probabilities. Edwards andGrossman indicate
similar effects of mother's schooling and family sizeon the probability
that a youth received a preventive dental examination with thepast
47More educated adults have higher probabilities of receiving
preventive care services such as chest X—rays andpapsmears)--'
The importance of mother's schooling andfamily sizein preven-
tive care utilization are underscored by Colle and Grossman's analysis
of differences between black and white children in the probability of
anambulatory contact and the probability of a preventive physical
132/ examination within the past year.— They showthatthe welfare pro—
grain,includingMedicaid, almost completely eliminates inmome—related
differences in these twoindexesof pediatric care between black and
whitechildren. Black—white differences in these measures persist
primarily because black mothers have less education than white moth-
ers andbecause black mothers have more children than white mothers.
Cna n speculatethat income—related differences in thesemeasures
and others persist over time for similar reasons. In particular,
high—income mothers have more education and fewer children than low
iue mothers, Although researchers have not examined the latter
issue explicitly, Edwards and Grossman show that income-related dif—
•f-ncsin several measures of the health of white children are due
;.arily to differences in mother's. schooling andtoa lesser extent
133/ family size.—
-
Theimplications of these findings are at the same time both
disheartening and heartening. They are dishearteningbecause they
implythat policies to reduce differences in utilization via NHI and
policies to reduce differences inhealthviaincometransfers and NHI
may not succeed. This is because the key differences are inschooling
andfamilysize. These are extremely costly to reduce and will notbe
48altered, at least in the short run, by NHI arid income transfers.!'
At the same time, the findings are heartening because black—white
differences in schooling have narrowed over time, particularly since
1970. In 1960, the difference between the median school years com-
pleted by white females and the median school years completed by
black females stood at 2.6 years. This difference declined to 2.0
years in 1970 and to 1.0 years in l977..2t' Recall that the infant
mortality rate, which historically has been higher for blacks than
for whites, declined rapidly from 1964 to 1974. Is there a hint in
these trends that a future policy of laissez faire may be the best
one?
IV. Implications for Optimal National Health Insurance
In this concluding section we consider the implications of our
analysis with respect to whether preventive care should be covered
under NHI and with respect to the nature of the optimal plan. To be
sure, we have already considered some of the implications of our dis—
cussionsof the effects anddeterminants of preventive care in
Sections II and III.Ourpurpose here is to pull together these
empiricalimplications andothersafter first considering theoretical
justifications for governnent subsidization of preventivecare. Note
thatour intention is neither to design anoptimal plan nor to estimate
the costs of alternative plans. Rather our intention is to underscore
relevant factors that should be kept in mind when decisions are made
with respect to preventive care under NHI. Put differently, we do
not have all the answers, but we want toraise somerelevant cjues-
tions.
49The main justification for government interference with the pre-.
ventive medical care decisions of its citizens is the existence of ex-
ternalities. Twobasictypes of health—related externalities have been
identified. Production externalities refer to situations in which the
health of some individuals depends on the health or preventive medical
care utilization of others. Consumptionexternalitiesrefer to situ-
ations in which the utility, rather than the health, of some individ—
uals depends on the health or preventive medical care consumption of
others.!.' In either situation it iseasy to show that free rider
problems will lead at least some individuals to choose levels of
health or preventive medical care that are less than optimal from
society's point of view. Whenthereis a one—to—one correspondence
rweenhealth andpreventivemedical care, itmakes littlediffer-
ence whether the externality is specified in terms of health or in
terms of care. This is likely to be true for immunizations against
irectjousdiseases. But in the morecommon case thereis a multi—
variate health production function, where medical care cansubstitute
otherinputs. Here itmakesa difference whether a consumption
exrnalityisspecified in terms of health or in terms of the input
of preventive medical care. It also makes a difference whether a
production externality is specified in terms of preventive medical
care or in terms of all preventive activities including preventive
nonmedical activities such as careful driving. Wediscusssomeim-
plications of this distinction below.
Theother justification for government attempts to modify the
preventive caredecisionsof its citizens that we wish to consider
50is the existence of moral hazard. Wereferto situations in which an
individual pays a fixed premium for thepurchase of a health insurance
policy that covers renedial (curative) medical care servicesasso-
ciated with illness or accidents. That is, thepremiumdoesnot re-
flect the individual's probability of becomingill, a probability
that is negatively related to preventivecare. Pauly shows that moral
hazard results inoverinsurance of remedialcare andtoo littlepre-
ventive care.2.' Putdifferently, it results in a substitution to—
138/ ward remedial care and away from preventivecare.— Clearly, there
is a close correspondence between a theoreticalargument to cover pre-
ventive care under NHI to combat moral hazard anda practical argument
to cover preventive care in order to contain thecost of
Armed with the above justifications forgovernment intervention
in the preventive care market and withour detailed treatment of the
t?xtent of third—party coverage of care and the effectsand determi—
ofcare, we offer the following theoretical and empirical impli-
cations with respect to preventive care and NHI.
(1) When production and consumption externalitiesare specified
Jntcrmsof preventive medical care, the optimalway to deal with
these externalities is to subsidize the full(money and indirect) price
of care. This provides a justification forthe coverageof preventive
careunder NHI to lower the money price. Butas demonstrated by Pauly,
the optimal price cut should not be thesamefor everyone. In par-
ticular, sincethe private demand for preventive care rises withincome,
theoptimal price reduction should fall with income.Beyond some in—
co-ne,no price reduction is required. Moreover, theoptimal insurance
51plan does not andshouldnot eliminate income—related differences in
utilization. Instead, it should reduce such differences.
(2) Wenotethat the size of the optimal price dut depends on
the price elasticity of demandforcare at each income level. For
example, if more refined estimates suggest that the price elasticity
of demand for care is greater the lower is the level of income, a
relatively small price cut would achieve substantial effects. It
follows that the optimal price cut need not be monotonically related
to income, if price elasticities of demandforcare fall sufficiently
rapidly as income increases.!!2( This points to the need to obtain
precise estimates of response to price changes in order to formulate
an actualprice structure that is any waynear optimal.
(3) Theindirect costs of travel, waiting, entry, and information
are important determinants of utilization. From an administrative
point of view, these costs probably would be difficult to measure and
allocateunder NHI. For this reason health manpowerprograms and
'amstodevelop delivery systems that lower indirect costs should
be ignored when NHI policies are being formulated.
(4)When production and consumptionexternalities are specified
interms of health and the health production function has a multi-
variate form, the optimal policy involves reductions in the prices of
allinputs thatcontribute to favorable health outcomes, Sinceprac-
tical difficulties might preclude this approach, an income transfer
program,possibly accompanied by reductions in the prices of easily-
identified inputs, especially inputs whose shares in health costsare
52large, might represent a second—best solution.!' This is why income
transfers should not be ignored when NHI is being considered. Both
can be viewed as alternative, although not necessarily competing,
meansto accomplish the same goal. Regardless of the nature of the
optimal program,if theprivate demand for health rises with income,!it
theoptimal transfer or price reductions should fall with income.
Income—related differences in health or differences due to factorscor-
related with inome such as race or schooling are reduced but not elirn—
• 143/ mated by the opttmal plan.—
(5) The application of a common coinsurancerate(possibly zero)
to preventive medical carearidcurative medical care underNI-lI might
ormight not reduce moral hazard. The price of the former relative
to tb Ltter is unaffected by NHI only if the time pricecomponents
andthe grossmoney prices of each are the same or if the ratio of
timeprice to total price is the samefor each type of care. This is
because the money price of curative care in the event of
serious illness undoubtedly exceeds themoney price of preventive care,
the time price of the former is smaller than that of the latter.
i.f the relative price ratio is not affected, undesirablesubstitu—
tiorisaway from other goods including preventive nonrnedical care and
toward curative care might occur.!!±"
(6) Prenatal care arid dental care are effective, butpediatric
care(except for immunizations) andpreventivedoctor care for adults
areriot.Moreover, health outcnes in which care is effective cor-
respond to outcomes in which income—differences in health areobserved.
These empirical results and the theory of healthas a consumptionitem
53suggest that the optimal NHIplan shouldbe characterized by benefits
that fall as income rises. In addition, the plan should be selective
rather than general with respect to the typesofservices covered.
For instance, instead of providing complete coverage for preventive
physicians' services to persons of all ages under NHI, the government
should direct its attention at prenatal care and physicians' services
145/ during the first year of life.— Similarly, the effectiveness of
dental care throughout the life cycle suggests that the payoffs to
the coverage of dental care from the age it is first received until
age eighteen or beyond are substantial.2!" It should be kept in
mind, however, that a cost—effective alternative to preventive dental
careexists in the form of water fluoridation, and that half of the
populationof the U.S. resides in communities with less thanoptimal
fluoride levels. So perhaps the optimal policy might be to attach
significant coinsurance rates to dental care under NHI and simul-
taneously to encourage communities to adjust the fluoride content of
their water supply systems.
(7) We do not know the income levels at which benefitsfor pre—
natal arid dentalservices should end. We do know that thereis little
theoretical justification for the provision of benefits to persons
fromallincome levels. Moreover, trends in the private health in-
surancemarket indicate that benefits might cease at a fairly moder-
ate income level. We refer to therapidincreases in the percentages
of the population with obstetrical care and dental care insurance in
the recent past. The reductions in net price associated with these
increases in coverage imply thatthe private demand of many families
147/ for effective services may be substantial.—
54(8) Any discussion of preventive N}41 cannot ignore thata network
of public programs already exists to finance and deliverpreventive
services to the poverty population. This network, which consists of
Medicaid, the maternal andchildhealth program, andtheneighborhood
health center program, constitutes a preventive NHI system formany
poor persons. Despite valid criticisms, this system has made at least
some improvements in the health of the poor. We canseeno reason to
scrap it. Rather what is called for is a more uniform set of eliqibil—
ity standards andsomemodifications intheways inwhichservices are
deliveredand providers are reimbursed. In particular, less fragmenta-
tion of the health care delivery system would be desirable. Indeed it
has been shown that this fragmentation is a major source ofdelay and
nonnnrnnliance to treatment of recognized illness as well as for follow—
148/ ups to early detection.—
(9) We will not discuss Medicaid reform in any detail because
-.t Lc is the subject of another paper in this volume. We will
comment, however, on two aspects of the proposed reforms. First, our
lack of enthusiasm for coverage of preventive physicians' servicesde—
lzcrecI to persons beyond the age of one under NHI does notimply that
wethink that existing Medicaid coverage ofthese services should be
cutback.Instead, we arenotenthusiastic about future expansionsin
thisarea. Second, some persons view the declining trend in theper-
centage of children immunizedagainst polio with alarm. They use this
trendas evidence in favor of the CHAPexpansionof the EPSDT program
under Medicaid. Yet the trendmaysimply reflect a reduction in the
benefitsassociated with immunization ina period during which the56
incidence of polio has been practically eliminated. Similar comments
apply to argumentsmarshalledin support of CHAPbasedon income—
related differences in rates of immunization against other infectious
diseases. In the present—day U.S., externalities associated with
these diseases are of little importance. To the extent that higher—
income parents "demand" a lower probability that their children con-
tact these diseases, income—related differences should persist in
equilibrium. This is not to say that the present differentials are
the optimal ones dictated by a merit-externality model. But we would
like to suggest that, in a climate of "tight" Federal andstatebud-
gets, the prenatal care initiatives in CHAPshouldbe given a much
higherpriority than the other parts of the program.
(10)Even in cases in which preventive care iseffective, the
provision of more care to blacks or low—income persons will not and
should not eliminate differences in health. Moreover, income trans—
fers will not eliminate these differences because health varies among
individuals with income andpreventivecare held constant. In par-
ticular, the studies that we have reviewed point to mother's schooling
as a key "preventive nonmedical determinant" of infant health and oral
health outcomes. Race and income—related differences in mother's
schooling are extremely costly to offset. Further, mother's schooling
andpreventivecare may be complements. It is known that more educa-
ted mothers makemoreuseofprenatal care anddental care;andit is
plausiblethat the impact of care on certain health outcomes rises as
schooling rises.!2." Another example of complertientarity may be corn—
pliance with the treatment prescribed as a result of a screeningexamination. For instance, in the case ofhypertension, more educated
consumers may be more likely to modify their dietsandtake the appro-
priate medication. Lest the reader be disheartenedhe should recall
thedramatic decline in the difference between blackfemale and white
female schooling levels since 1970. Thisdecline may narrow race and
income—relateddifferences in health in the future and curtailthe
amount of preventive medical care that thegovernment should finance
on the grounds of consumption externalities.
(11) Finally it is worth repeating thatour arguments in favor
ofnational health insurance rest onexternalities. Yet there is a
market for private contributions for medicalcare, throughseveral
nonprofitinstitutions. It is an open question to whatextent pro-
duction and consumption externalitiesare already internalized
through private giving and voluntary transfers.
Otir answers tothe threequestions posed by this conference are
-as follows:
Preventive NHI: WhatNow? Medicaidreform with an emphasis on
prenatal care, mandatorydentalcoverage for Medicaid children
PreventiveNHI: What Later? A preventive NHIprogram for mod— -crate—incomefamilies with an emphasis on prenatalcare and dental care, mandatory dentalcoverage for Medicaid adults
PreventiveNHI: WhatNever?Comolete coverage of all preven- ______-;----_-_----------------- tivemedical care services for allgroups in the population
These answers appear to be at variance withthe widespread support for
comprehensive anduniversalN}fI expressed in the media andinpublic
opinionpolls. Are wesimply "bucking" an inevitable trend? We think
not. Although most people say they favorNHI, a recent survey by the
57Health Insurance Institute shows that this percentage falls dramatically
when it is pointed out that the enactment of NHIislikely to be accon—
150/ panied by higher taxes.—Thus,when people are asked to put their
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